Commissioned by International Rivers and Environmental Defense
By May 2005, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank are expected to
decide whether or not to finance the US$1.3 billion Nam Theun 2
hydropower project in Lao PDR.
If completed, the project would displace more than 6,200 indigenous
people and negatively affect the livelihoods of up to 100,000 villagers
living downstream.
The World Bank claims that the project has been
carefully planned so that, unlike past hydro projects, people displaced
or otherwise threatened will not be left worse off. As well, the Bank
claims that the dam’s negative environmental impacts can be
successfully mitigated.
Because an independent review of the developers’ plans
is not possible in Lao PDR, International Rivers and
Environmental Defense invited several experts in Thailand and the US to
review the November 2004 drafts of the Nam Theun 2 Social Development
Plan, Environmental Assessment and Management Plan, and Watershed
Management Plan (SEMFOP–1).
The reviewers found serious flaws in the Company’s
assessment of the Nam Theun 2 Project’s environmental and social
impacts. This not only casts doubt on the project’s technical and
economic viability, but also suggests that the risk of social and
environmental failure is unacceptably high. The reviewers’ key findings
are summarized below:
Part 1: Hydrology
Hydrologists Dr. Peter Willing and Karla Knoop found that:
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Due to the paucity of
hydrological data, and questionable statistical analysis techniques,
"the project is high risk for meeting its power generation predictions
and for estimating project impacts."
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The Nam Theun 2 Environmental
Assessment and Management Plan (EAMP) contains no hydrologic analysis,
but contains references to unpublished supporting work. For much of the
critical hydrologic analysis on which depends the entire assessment of
the performance of the project and its environmental consequences, the
Nam Theun 2 project sponsors have not provided the underlying data or
explained the methodology used, thereby making robust independent
analysis impossible.
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The project plans are based
on a maximum of 18–years of stream flow and rainfall records, which is
not a statistically valid basis for deriving 100–year and greater flood
estimates.
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Hydraulic modeling did not
include the upper and middle reaches of Xe Bang Fai River even though
significant changes in water elevations will occur and impacts should
be assessed.
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The project developers have undertaken no analysis of how global climate change might affect flows in the Theun River.
Independent Technical Review: NT2 Hydrology, by Peter Willing Ph.D. and Karla Knoop, January 20, 2005.
Part 2: Water Quality Impact Assessment
Aquatic Ecologist/Microbiologist Dr. Guy Lanza found that:
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The data used to characterize
the baseline water quality in the project area is wholly inadequate,
and as result, accurate predictions of the water quantity and quality
changes that will occur in the reservoir and downstream rivers are not
possible.
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No effective mitigation
strategies are offered in the EAMP to address the potential for
prolonged anoxia and resulting releases of nutrients and toxic gases in
the Nakai reservoir, which will result in the loss of adult and
juvenile fish and fish eggs.
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The EAMP fails to
comprehensively examine the possibility for toxic blooms of
cyanobacteria and algae in the reservoir, which can produce severe
sickness and mortality in humans, wildlife and livestock.
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The EAMP provides no data on
aquatic macroinvertebrates, which play a vital role in establishing and
maintaining good water quality and are an important source of food to
many fish and other species.
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The reservoir will expand the
habitat for vectors of major waterborne diseases known to inhabit the
project site. As a result, diseases such as malaria, dengue fever,
schistosomiasis, and liver fluke can quickly spread, posing additional
health risks for the resettled populations.
Independent Technical Review: NT2 Water Quality Assessment,
Guy Lanza, Ph.D., Aquatic Ecologist/Microbiologist, Environmental
Sciences Program, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA, January
2005.
Part 3: Downstream Fisheries Impacts on the Xe Bang Fai River
Fisheries and aquaculture specialist David Blake found that:
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Nam Theun 2 "is likely to have
multiple serious, negative impacts on the aquatic resources of the Xe
Bang Fai and Nam Phit rivers. As predicted in the Social Development
Plan, the Nam Theun 2 project is likely to cause a ‘collapse in the
aquatic food chain’ from the Nam Phit down to the Mekong."
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The EAMP lacks scientific and
rigorous analysis of impacts. Predictions of impacts on downstream
fisheries are based on three dry season surveys only. No study of fish
species and migrations during the rainy season has been conducted,
despite a recommendation from NTPC’s fisheries consultant in 1996.
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The EAMP has not been updated
to reflect design changes (in particular, greater turbined flows down
the Xe Bang Fai river) since the original impact predictions and
recommendations were made in 1996. As water levels will be more than
twice as high as was assumed in 1996, many of the predictions of
potential impacts are now outdated and underestimated.
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The submergence of rapids,
which are an important habitat and spawning ground for fish and many
other aquatic organisms, will have a major impact on the ability of
these organisms to survive.
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No assessment of the
project’s impacts on non–fish aquatic organisms important for human
consumption (i.e., mussels, shrimps, and aquatic plants) has been
conducted.
Independent Technical Review: NT2 Impacts on Xe Bang Fai Fisheries, David Blake, Mahasarakham, Thailand, January 2005.
Part 4: Compensation for Downstream (Xe Bang Fai) Communities
Fisheries and small–scale aquaculture specialist David Blake found that:
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The Nam Theun 2 Power Company
(NTPC) makes the unjustified assumption that loss of wild fisheries can
simply be replaced by introducing aquaculture or animal–raising options
to impacted villagers. This assumption shows that NTPC does not
comprehend the social, economic and practical problems involved in
attempting to introduce novel livelihood strategies to numerous
geographically widespread rural communities, hitherto inadequately
informed or prepared for the changes which they will experience post
operations.
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NTPC’s goal of completing all
mitigation and compensation activities within five years of commercial
operation is unrealistic, and, if implemented, will leave villagers
without adequate long–term livelihood options.
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The Company wrongly assumes
that aquaculture can be a direct replacement for lost capture
fisheries, which ignores local experience and the fact that cultured
fish do not have the same economic, nutritional or cultural value in
the diets of Lao villagers. Based on experience in Lao PDR and
Thailand, no more than 20% of households are likely to take up
aquaculture. Due to the costs of purchasing fish seed and food, the
poorest families would most likely miss out on the benefits of this
activity.
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It is unlikely that there
will be adequate human resources or supporting infrastructure in the
area to provide sufficient fish seed or offer training and extension
services.
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Proposals to introduce
alternative livestock production lack form and substance, nor do they
build on the experience of the Theun–Hinboun Power Company, which has
spent three years attempting with mixed results to introduce small
livestock in dam–affected villages. The proposition that cattle will be
preferred by villagers over small livestock and are feasible for mass
extension is unrealistic given local constraints.
Independent Technical Review: Compensation for Communities Living Along the Xe Bang Fai River, by David J.H. Blake, January 2005.
Part 5: Agriculture and Livestock Development Plan for Resettled Villagers
A rural development specialist found that:
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Irrigated farmland and
intensive livestock–raising are two of the livelihood options offered
as compensation by the Nam Theun 2 Power Company to resettled
households but there is a high risk of failure for both.
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The resettlement site has
extremely infertile soils that will require high inputs of both organic
and inorganic fertilizers and lime. Villagers will be provided with
support for these inputs for a period of 3–8 years. Because villagers
have never had to make such high inputs before, the Social Development
Plan notes the "very real likelihood" that villagers will not be
willing – or able – to do so once the project ceases support. Cropping
systems and fertilizer schemes proposed are untested and therefore
experimental.
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Though irrigated land for dry
season rice cropping has been promised, the Social Development Plan
acknowledges that this may only be feasible "in the longer term."
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The villagers will need to
rely on markets for their livelihoods, yet the Nakai Plateau is an
extremely remote area. In the early years of resettlement the
construction camps will likely provide a market for the produce.
However, if permanent markets do not develop, villagers will lose their
market base after construction is complete, which will coincide with
the cessation of agricultural support.
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The reservoir will flood
45,000 hectares of prime buffalo raising pasture and the resettlement
area does not have enough replacement land to support the resettlers’
existing buffalo herds. Proposals for alternative forage production are
inadequate, risky and untested.
Independent Technical Review: NT2 Agriculture and Livestock Development Plan, published by International Rivers, January 2005.
Part 6: Nam Theun 2 Reservoir Fisheries
Fisheries Biologist Eric Theiss found that:
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The Social Development Plan
presents the Nam Theun 2 reservoir fishery as one of four livelihood
options for the 6,200 people displaced by the project but this
presumption "is a precarious gamble at best."
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Rather than introducing fish
species into the reservoir, the reservoir fisheries plan recommends
closing the dam gates after the migratory season and allowing native
species to adapt to the changed conditions. However, the reservoir is
likely to be anoxic (lacking in oxygen) during the first few years
after impoundment as a result of decomposing biomass left in the
inundation area. As fish cannot survive without oxygen, most of the
fish trapped during the initial filling of the reservoir are likely to
die during the initial years after dam construction.
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Dam operations will shrink
the reservoir to less than a fifth of its size during the dry season,
which eliminates most of the underwater habitat. As the reservoir level
decreases there will be less and less water capable of sustaining fish
life. The deeper and relatively stagnant parts extending back from the
dam are likely to be uninhabitable due to anoxic conditions.
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Assuming there are fish to
catch, the shallow depth and seasonal muddy drawdown of the reservoir
would likely make subsistence fishing too costly and time consuming.
Villagers would have to transport boats, outboard motors, and fishing
equipment over long distances through deep mud to the lakeshore and
back again.
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At best, a small number of
fish species could survive in the reservoir; at worst, the reservoir
"will become largely devoid of life, except for invasive aquatic weeds
and small islands of survivor fish species near the tributary mouths."
Independent Technical Review: NT2 Reservoir Fisheries Plan, Eric Theiss, Fisheries Biologist, Sustainable Environment Foundation, February 2005.
Part 7: Forestry Development Program for Resettled Villagers
A rural development specialist found that:
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While NTPC has proposed
community forestry operations for resettled villagers, the SDP admits
that the profitability of the venture is unlikely. Past illegal logging
activities have dramatically reduced the availability of quality timber
in the resettlement area. In order to ensure profitability, tax
concessions must be secured and post–harvest chemical treatment of
timber must take place, but both of these are uncertain. If either one
fails to materialize the viability of the entire plan will be
jeopardized.
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Villagers will lose a major
part of their income from the collection and sale of non timber forest
products (NTFPs), many of which will disappear once the reservoir is
flooded. The community forestry area can be used to harvest some NTFPs,
but a 1997 survey reveals that due to the poor soils, this area will
produce "very few NTFPs". There are few plans for a substitute NTFP
base. In addition, the SDP does not address the fact that NTFP
collection currently occurs in the proposed community forestry area by
villagers who do not live on the Nakai Plateau. Their access to these
NTFP collection sites will presumably be lost when the forestry
development program is initiated.
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The SDP recommends the
establishment of the Nakai Plateau Village Forestry Association (NPVFA)
to manage the forest area and harvest, process and sell the timber on a
sustainable basis. Profits will be distributed equally between all the
resettled households. From a managerial perspective, the operation of
this association seems particularly optimistic given the present
capacity of villagers and government staff.
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NTPC plans to fund the
forestry program mainly in the first year. After this time the forestry
association will be on its own. Given the complexity and uncertain
economic viability of the operation, NTPC should offer financial
support for the first 5 years at least, until the forestry association
establishes its viability.
Independent Technical Review: NT2 Forestry Development Program, Published by International Rivers, February 2005.
Part 8: Review of the Watershed Management Plan (SEMFOP–1)
Independent experts with extensive experience in conservation and development in the region found that:
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The management of the Nakai
Nam Theun 2 National Protected Area (NNT NPA) will be funded primarily
by contributions from NTPC of US$1 million per year. The provision of
substantial funding alone is unlikely to result in the sound management
of NNT. The main constraint to improved management of the area is poor
institutional commitment and a lack of secure property rights for local
people, not funding. If funds are used inappropriately, greater
environmental degradation and negative impacts on the livelihoods of
NNT’s residents are possible and perhaps even likely.
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Protected area management has
a poor track record in Lao PDR. Independent monitoring of the SEMFOP,
with linkages between funding and performance, is essential. The
monitoring arrangement proposed in the SEMFOP fails the test of
independence.
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The SEMFOP proposes to use
part of its funding to improve access into NNT. However, some of the
most significant threats to the protected area, such as unsustainable
wildlife trade, unsustainable commercial sale of some NTFPs, illegal
encroachment logging, and excessive population growth, are likely to be
made worse, not better, by increased access. This is especially true in
light of the additional pressure on NNT that will result from the
influx of around 20,000 construction workers and their families into
the area.
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The NNT NPA has several
inherent management advantages, such as partial insulation from the
insatiable market for natural resources, low population density,
remarkably diverse agricultural systems, and the relatively stable,
secure livelihoods of many of its residents. The SEMFOP does not
adequately focus on simply protecting these advantages.
Independent Technical Review: NT2 Social and Environmental Management Framework for the Nakai-Nam Theun Watershed, compiled by Environmental Defense, February 2005.
In March 2005, the World Bank issued a response to the Nam Theun 2
technical reviews commissioned by International Rivers and
Environmental Defense. In its response, the World Bank only referred to
the Summary of the Nam Theun 2 Technical Reviews
of the technical reviews and did not consider the full reports. Read
comments below on the World Bank’s response from David Blake (reviewer of Xe
Bang Fai fisheries and compensation studies) and Dr. Guy Lanza
(reviewer of the water quality assessment).